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Introduction
The last couple of years have witnessed a surge of academic as well as journalistic writings on tax evading activities. 1 One reason for this interest is that tax evasion opportunities may create various distortions in the behaviour of economic agents. For example, too much work may be carried out in the informal sector if consumer wages are relatively higher in this sector. 2 In this paper we argue that the choice to acquire higher education may also be distorted by tax evasion opportunities. If workers with a lower level of education to a larger extent face job opportunities in an informal sector, there are less incentives to acquire higher education. More informal job opportunities, higher taxes and lower punishment fees reduce the relative pay-off from education which, in turn, induce less workers to educate themselves. This hypotheses is consistent with data. For example, using survey data of the shadow sector in Sicily, Boeri and Garibaldi (2002) show that mainly workers at the lower end of the skill distribution engage in informal activities. Pedersen and Smith (1998) , using comprehensive survey data, show that almost half of the informal sector activities in Denmark are carried out within the construction sector. They also find that around 70 percent of the total hours performed in the informal sector is carried out within the service sector or construction sector. Furthermore, Pedersen (2003) , using the same questionnaire design for five countries, concludes that most informal activity in Great Britain, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden is carried out within the construction sector. In Germany most informal activity takes place within a group of sectors denoted: Fishing, Agriculture (including tree-felling and gardening) and Mining. Finally, performing logistic regressions for the five countries, Pedersen (2003) confirms that skilled blue color workers carry out more black market activities than others, and that the likelihood of black market activities falls with the length of education. 3 With this evidence in mind, the aim of the paper is threefold. First, we want to examine how the government tax and punishment policies affect the incentives to acquire higher education. Second, we want to examine how labour market performance, including wage formation, unemployment, wage dispersion, and the size of the informal sector is affected by tax and punishment policies. Third, we aim at characterizing the optimal tax and punishment system.
To that end, we develop a three-sector general equilibrium model featuring matching frictions and worker-firm wage bargains. Workers differ in ability and decide whether or not to acquire higher education. We assume that it is costly in terms of effort to acquire higher education, implying that only high ability workers find this worthwhile. Only workers who choose not to acquire higher education, whom we refer to as manual workers, face job opportunities in both the formal and the informal sector. This assumption approximates that employment opportunities in an informal sector to a larger extent face workers with a lower level of education. Unemployed manual workers search for jobs in both sectors by allocating their search effort optimally between them.
We find that increased government punishment of the informal sector reduces the size of this sector. Moreover, the number of unemployed workers is likely to fall, formal wage dispersion increases, and the number of highly educated workers increases. While considering welfare, we find that it is optimal to choose the punishment rates so to more than fully counteract the distortion created by the government's inability to tax the informal sector. The optimal choice of tax and punishment system, however, implies an inefficiently low stock of educated workers.
Early theoretical analyses of tax evasion are provided by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Srinivasan (1973) , where underreporting of income is modeled as a decision made under uncertainty. Subsequent papers have enhanced the basic model of individual behaviour by, for example, incorporating endogenous labour supply decisions. 4 Also general than legitimate activities. See Freeman (1999) for a survey of the economics of crime. Also, the theoretical study by Burdett, Lagos and Wright (2003) develops a model where workers are less likely to commit crimes when their wages are higher. This has a parallel to informal sector work where high skill workers may not to the same extent get full pay-off for their higher productivity, which makes informal activities less attractive for highly educated workers. 4 See for example Andersen (1977) and Sandmo (1981) for early contributions of endogenous labour supply and underreporting of income.
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I F A U -D o e s t a x e v a s i o n a ffect unemployment and educational choice? equilibrium models with tax evasion have been developed (for an excellent example see Cremer and Gahvari (1993) ). Several theoretical papers have also recognized that the opportunities for tax evasion differ across occupations. See for example Watson (1985) , and Pestieau and Possen (1991). Occupational choice in this literature is usually thought of as a choice between self-employment, where under-reporting is possible, and regular employment, where under-reporting is not an option. Pestieau and Possen (1991) assume that workers choose either to be entrepreneurs or regular employees. Workers differ in risk aversion and under-reporting is only available for entrepreneurs. They argue that tax evasion should be allowed to some degree in order to maintain a large stock of productive entrepreneurs.
The principal contribution of the analyses in this paper is that we shed light on how the presence of work opportunities in an informal sector can affect the educational attainment in an economy. This has, to our knowledge, not been explored in the previous literature. Another important contribution is that we incorporate an imperfectly competitive labour market, which facilitates an analysis of how tax and punishment policies affect wage setting and unemployment. Previous research is mainly conducted within the public finance tradition, where wages are either assumed to be fixed or determined by market clearing. By definition, such framework is unable to examine how involuntary unemployment is affected by tax and punishment policies.
There have, however, been some recent studies of how tax and punishment policies affect involuntary unemployment; see Larsen (2001,2002) , Cavalcanti (2002) , Boeri and Garibaldi (2002) and Fugazza and Jacques (2003) . This paper differs from these previous studies in that it does not rely on relative price adjustments (as Kolm and Larsen, 2001 , 2002 , and Cavalcanti, 2002 or heterogeneity in moral attitudes and a fixed number of vacancies (as Fugazzi and Jacques, 2003), to generate a stable equilibrium where both formal and informal jobs coexist. Neither does it rely on the assumption that informal jobs only come about as matched formal jobs are hit by a bad productivity shock (as Boeri and Garibaldi, 2002) in order to generate coexistence of formal and informal jobs. Rather this paper assumes directed search where the unemployed workers are optimally allocating search effort into both the formal and the informal sector. We assume that the effectiveness of search falls with search time into a sector. This could capture that different search meth-ods are used when searching for a job in a market. The more time that is used in order to search in a market, the less efficient search methods have to be used. This particular modeling strategy of search effort has a close resemblance to how search is modelled in van den Berg and van der Klaauw (2001). They extend the Mortensen (1986) model to account for that workers can use more than one search channel when seeking for a job, and generate an optimal split of search time between different channels by assuming increasing and convex search costs. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3, examines how the equilibrium variables (e.g. tightness, wages, wage dispersion, employment and unemployment rates, unemployment stock, and the stock of educated workers) are affected by a fully financed change in the punishment system. Section 4 concerns the optimal design of tax and punishment policies. Section 5 concludes.
The model
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The economy consists of a labour force which differs in ability to acquire education. Abilities, e, are uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, e ∈ [0, 1]. Based on ability, workers decide whether or not to educate themselves. We assume that it is costless to become a manual worker, but that workers who educate themselves find it costly to do so. 6 The cost of education, c(e) is decreasing in ability, c 0 (e) < 0.
Manual workers face job opportunities in both a formal and an informal sector, whereas highly educated workers only face employment opportunities in a formal sector. This is a simplifying assumption approximating the fact that manual workers perform informal sector work to a much higher extent than highly educated workers. The economy thus consists of three sectors; the formal manual sector (denoted the formal sector F ), the informal manual sector (denoted the informal sector I), and the highly educated sector (denoted h). Manual workers have productivity y m and highly educated workers have productivity y h > y m .
Manual workers
Matching
The manual workers search for jobs in the formal and the informal sector. For simplicity, we assume that only unemployed workers search for jobs. This is a simplification, i.e. we do not acknowledge that the connection to the labour market given by working in the formal sector may bring about job opportunities not available while unemployed. Workers accept job offers as long as the expected payoff exceeds their reservation wage. The matching functions for the manual sectors are given by
, where X j m is the sectorial matching rate, v j m , is the sectorial vacancy rate, and u m is the unemployment rate facing manual workers. The rates are defined as the numbers relatively to the manual labour force. Manual workers allocate search effort optimally between the formal and the informal sector. Each worker's total search intensity is exogenously given and normalised to unity, where σ I = σ denotes search effort directed towards the informal sector, and σ F = 1 − σ denotes search effort directed towards the formal sector. The parameter γ < 1 captures that the effectiveness of search falls with search effort, i.e., the first unit of search in one sector is more effective than the subsequent units of search. The transition rates into formal and informal sector employment for a particular manual worker i, are λ
are labour market tightness. Labour market tightness is measured in effective search units. 7 The rates at which vacant jobs become filled are q
Value functions
Let U m , E F m , and E I m denote the expected present values of unemployment, and employment in the two sectors. The value functions for worker i then 7 One could, of course, choose a different definition of tightness, for example θ IFAU-Does tax evasion affect unemployment and educational choice ? 7 reads:
where r is the exogenous discount rate, w j m is the sector wage, and s is the exogenous separation rate. R is a lump sum transfer that all individuals receive from the government which reflects that the government has some positive revenue requirements. The parameter t is the proportional income tax rate, p is the probability of being detected working in the informal sector, and δ is the proportion of the evaded income the worker has to pay as a punishment fee if detected. The match is dissolved when detected which implies that the separation rate in the informal sector exceeds the formal sector separation rate. For simplicity, we disregard from unemployment benefits.
Let J F m and V F m represent the expected present values of an occupied job and a vacant job in the formal sector, respectively. The arbitrage equations for a job paying the wage w F mi and a vacant job in the formal sector are then
where z is the payroll tax rate and y m is productivity. Vacancy costs are denoted k. Analogous notation for the informal sector yields:
where α is the proportion of the evaded wage the firm has to pay as a punishment fee if detected. The unemployed worker i allocates search between the two sectors, σ i , in order to maximize the value of unemployment, rU mi . A necessary condition for an interior solution is that γ < 1, which holds by assumption. The first order condition can be written as:
Workers allocate their search between sectors to equalize returns to search effort across the two sectors. 8 I F A U -D o e s t a x e v a s i o n a ffect unemployment and educational choice?
Wage determination
When a worker and firm meet they bargain over the wage, w j mi , taking economy wide variables as given. The first order conditions from the Nash bargaining solutions, with the worker's bargaining power being equal to β, can be written as:
where φ t = We can now derive an equation determining how search is allocated between the two sectors in a symmetric equilibrium by substituting (9) and (10) into (8) (5) and (7) together with free entry. This yields:
where
is the wedge between the informal sector and the formal sector. We can interpret a ψ < 1 as if the informal sector is punished to a lesser extent than the formal sector is taxed. 8 Equation (11) is the core equilibrium equation. Recall from (8) that workers allocate their search between sectors so that the marginal returns to search effort in the two sectors are equal. With wages being endogenously determined in equilibrium, this implies to account for the wedge, ψ, and for differences in sectorial labour market tightness, , when deciding where to allocate search. For example, if the informal sector is punished to a lesser extent than the formal sector is taxed, ψ < 1, unemployed workers tend to direct more search into the informal sector. And the relatively tighter the formal sector is, the larger formal sector search tends to be.
By use of equation (1)- (7) and (11) in equations (9) and (10), equilibrium producer wages, ω j m , j = F, I, are given by:
Wages increase with labour market tightness and decrease with search intensity in each sector. This follows as a higher labour market tightness and a lower search intensity improve the worker's bargaining position. An increase in tightness makes it easier for an unemployed worker to find a job, and at the same time harder for a firm to fill a vacancy. This improves the worker's relative bargaining position, resulting in higher wage demands. An increase in search, will instead reduce the worker's bargaining position. This follows as the effectiveness of search falls with more search, i.e., γ < 1. Sectorial wage demands are hence moderated with increased search into the sector. 9 From (13), (14) together with (11) it follows that producer wages in the formal sector exceed informal sector producer wages when ψ < 1, and vice versa when ψ > 1. Moreover, rewriting (13) and (14) in terms of consumer wages we have that consumer wages in the formal sector subceed informal sector consumer wages when ψ < 1, and vice versa when ψ > 1. More specifically we have
. 9 An alternative way of describing the intuition for why increased sector search reduces wage demands is the following. When search time into one sector increases, the bargaining position for firms in that sector improves. This follows as firms in that sector then will find it easier to match with a new worker in case of no agreement. The improved bargaining position for firms moderates wage pressure. Analogous reasoning holds in case search effort into a secctor falls.
Labour market tightness
Labour market tightness for the formal sector and the informal sector are determined by equation (4), (5), (6) and (7) using the free entry condition and the wage equations (13) and (14):
With ψ < 1, informal producer wages are lower than formal producer wages and hence the expected instantaneous profits in the informal sector exceed the instantaneous profits in the formal sector. 10 This makes it more attractive for firms to enter the informal sector which tends to make informal tightness exceed formal tightness. However, as the separation rate in the formal sector is lower, s < s+ p, the formal sector expected job duration is longer. This makes the formal sector more attractive to enter. Consequently, it is possible to have θ 
Highly educated workers
Highly educated workers applying for jobs in sector h do not have the opportunity to obtain employment in an informal sector. The total time unit of search is allocated into search in sector h, i.e., σ h = 1. The matching function is given by a standard matching function,
where v h is the vacancy rate and u h is the unemployment rate for educated workers. Worker and firm transition rates then become
, and q h = θ −η h . Educated workers pay the individual educational costs c(e i ), where e i is the worker's ability, e i ∈ [0, 1] and c 0 (e i ) < 0. Let U h and E h denote the expected present values of unemployment and 10 The right-hand side of equations (15) and (16), are simply the instantaneous profits, i.e., π F = ym − ω F m and π I = ym − ω I m , where we from the previous section know that
IFAU-Does tax evasion affect unemployment and educational choice? 11 employment. The value functions for worker i then reads: 11
where w h denotes the wage for educated workers. Sector h firms employ workers with the marginal productivity y h and have the time unit probability q h of filling a vacancy. Let J h and V h represent the expected present values of an occupied job and a vacant job in the educated sector. The arbitrage equations for a job and a vacant job in the educated sector are:
Wages, w hi , are determined by Nash Bargaining with the workers' bargaining power equal to β. The first order condition can be written analogous to equation (9) . We can solve for the bargained wage by using this first order condition and equations (17)- (20), assuming free entry, (i.e., V h = 0), and a symmetric equilibrium. The bargained wage is given by: ω h = w h (1 + z) = β (y h + θ h k). Labour market tightness in sector h, θ h , can be derived from equations (19) and (20) , using the free entry condition and the expression for w h :
Education
When workers decide whether to acquire higher education or remain a manual worker, they compare the value of unemployment as an educated worker to the value of unemployment as a manual worker. Workers with low ability find it too costly in terms of effort to acquire higher education, whereas high ability workers find it more than worthwhile to do so since they face lower costs of education. The marginal worker has an ability level,ê, which makes him just indifferent between acquiring higher education and remaining a manual worker. We can write the condition determining the ability level of the marginal worker as:
We can rewrite this expression in a number of ways using earlier equations. For example, by using equations (1)- (3), it is clear that the value of unemployment for a manual worker is captured by
. This expression reveals that it is the consumer wages in the formal and informal sector, weighted by the employment opportunities in each sector that is important for the unemployment value of manual workers. 12 (17) and (18), where µ h = λ h /(r + s + λ h ).
As wages are endogenous we can use equations (1), (18), and (22) together with the first order conditions for wages, and equations (5), (7), (11), (20) together with the free entry condition which gives the following simplified condition:
Equation (23) givesê as a function of the endogenous variables θ h , θ F m , and σ. Workers with e ≤ê, choose not to acquire education, whereas workers with e >ê acquire education. Hence,ê and 1 −ê resolve the manual and educated labour forces, respectively.
Unemployment
Steady state employment and unemployment rates for manual and educated workers are derived by considering the flows into and out of employment. The equations determining the employment rates in the formal sector and the informal sector, n F m , n I m , and the manual unemployment rate, u m , are given by: λ Solving for the employment rates, the actual and the observed unemployment rates for manual workers, we obtain:
For sector h, flows into unemployment and out of unemployment are also equalized, whereby the unemployment rate among educated workers is
Comparing equations (25) and (26), note that we cannot immediately determine whether unemployment facing manual workers is higher or lower than unemployment for educated workers. Higher productivity for educated workers, y h > y m together with the higher average separation rate for manual workers, tends to make u m exceed u h . However, as manual workers can apply for jobs in two sectors, which the educated worker cannot, u h tends to exceed u m .
The actual and official total number of unemployed workers are given by
Equilibrium
Equilibrium equations determining labour market tightness in the three sectors (θ 
Labour market tightness in the two sectors employing manual workers are determined together with search intensity in (27), (28), and (29). Independently, we solve for labour market tightness in sector h from (30). Finally, the labour force allocation into manual workers and educated workers is determined by (31) given the solutions for θ 
Comparative statics
This section is concerned with the impact of the tax and punishment system on tightness, search intensity, producer wages, employment and unemployment rates, wage dispersion, the number of unemployed workers, and the number of educated workers. Proofs of all Propositions are given in the Appendix.
We only consider fully financed changes in the punishment rates. Hence, changes in the punishment rates, α or δ, are always followed by adjustments in the tax rates, z or t, so as to balance the government budget restriction. The government budget restriction is given by:
where R is the exogenous government revenue requirements and ξ (p) is auditing costs. 13 13 We note that the tax and punishment rates, t and z and δ and α, will not appear in
Tightness, search intensity, and producer wages
The effects on tightness and allocation of search is summarized in the following proposition. 14 Proposition 1 A fully financed increase in a punishment rate (δ or α) will reallocate search intensity towards the formal sector (σ falls). Furthermore it will increase tightness in the formal sector (θ When tax evasion is punished more severely, unemployed workers will find it optimal to reallocate their search towards the formal sector. However, when search effort is reallocated towards the formal sector, wage demands in the formal sector fall whereas wage demands in the informal sector increase. This follows as the effectiveness of search in the formal sector falls as search increases, which weakens the workers' bargaining position. In contrast, the reduced search in the informal sector increases the effectiveness of informal sector search. This improves the bargaining position for workers in the informal sector. As the producer wage facing informal sector firms tends to increase, and the formal sector producer wage tends to fall, firms will exit the informal sector and enter the formal sector; formal sector tightness increases whereas informal sector tightness falls. As formal sector tightness raises relative to tightness in the informal sector, search is further reallocated towards the formal sector. This effect becomes smaller and smaller until the new equilibrium is reached. Tax rates will have no impact on the producer wage and tightness in sector h. Tax changes will always be absorbed by changes in the consumer the government budget restriction or in (24)-(31) other than through φ t and φ p . This reflects that it does not matter if we tax (punish) the firm side or the worker side.
From (24)- (29) it is clear that only ψ affects the equilibrium variables, σ, θ and φ p for a given ψ. Thus, any revenue requirement, R, can be attained by increasing φ t and φ p simultaneously so to keep ψ constant. This is a very convenient property when considering fully financed reforms.
14 For an intuitive intrepretation, propositions 1-4 are expressed as if an increase in φ p financed by adjustments in φ t implies that ψ = φ p /φ t increases. Other, although perhaps less plausible cases, are of course also incorporated. The propositions simply capture fully financed changes in the tax and punishment systems that affect the relative tax and punishment rates, ψ, between the formal and informal economy.
wage, leaving producer wages and tightness unaffected in the sector. 15 We summarize the effects on producer wages in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 A fully financed increase in the punishment rates (δ or α) will increase the producer wage in the informal sector (ω I m ) and reduce the producer wage in the formal sector (ω F m ). The producer wage in sector h (ω h ) is unaffected by changes in the tax and punishment rates.
Formal sector wage demands are reduced because the worker-firm bargaining position falls as search in the sector becomes less effective. In contrast, wage demands increase in the informal sector as informal sector search becomes more effective with the reduces search effort in the sector. However, there will be a dampening effect on wages due to that formal sector tightness increases and informal sector tightness falls.
Employment and unemployment rates
We summarize the results of the impact of the tax and punishment rates on the employment and unemployment rates in the following proposition: Proposition 3 A fully financed increase in the punishment rate (δ or α) will increase the employment rate in the formal sector (n F m ) and reduce the employment rate in the informal sector (n I m ). The unemployment rate for manual workers that are observable by the government (u o m ) falls. The actual unemployment rate for manual workers (u m ) falls if ψ < 1. The unemployment rate for educated workers (u h ) is unaffected.
It comes as no surprise that increased punishment of the informal sector induces a reallocation of manual workers from the informal towards the formal sector. The formal sector employment rate increases as the transition rate into formal sector employment increases. This, in turn, is caused by the increase in formal sector tightness and the reallocation of search effort towards the formal sector. In contrast, as tightness and search effort in the informal sector fall, the transition rate into informal employment, and consequently the sectorial employment rate, falls.
The unemployment rate for manual workers falls as workers are reallocated towards the formal sector where jobs last on average a longer time. 16 In addition, the official unemployment rate falls both because the actual unemployment rate falls, and because workers are reallocated towards the formal sector.
Wage dispersion
Wage dispersion in terms of wages received by formal sector manual workers and educated workers is equal to:
As wage dispersion is increased whenever ω F m is reduced, we have the following result:
Proposition 4 A fully financed increase in the punishment rate (δ or α) will increase wage dispersion between formal sector manual workers and educated workers.
Increased punishment reduces formal sector wages for manual workers and hence increases the wage dispersion in-between educated workers and formal sector manual workers.
Education
A closer examination of (31) reveals that changes in the punishment rates, φ p = 1+pα 1−pδ , affects the share of educated workers, 1 −ê, through ψ only, whereas changes in the tax rates, φ t = 1+z 1−t , have a direct effect on 1 −ê 16 In case ψ > 1, the number of vacancies relatively to unemployment is reduced which will have a counteracting effect on unemployment. Consequently, the unemployment rate may increase in this case. Recall that ψ < 1 corresponds to the empirically most plausible case where producer wages in the formal sector exceed those in the informal sector, and where consumer wages in the informal sector exceeds those in the formal sector.
in addition to the effects working through ψ. 17 Therefore, in order to consider the effects of a fully financed change in the punishment rates on the number of educated workers, we have to account for repercussions on 1 −ê following adjustments in the tax rates. However, let us first consider the impact on 1−ê of a change in the tax and punishment rates separately:
Equation (33) shows that the number of educated workers increases with higher punishment rates for a given tax system. This summarizes the impact through several channels. First, there is a direct effect which induces more workers to educate themselves as increased punishment for a given tax system reduces the informal sector consumer wage. However, increased punishment rates also affect consumer wages through the wage negotiations; wages are reduced in the formal sector but increased in the informal sector. Moreover, employment opportunities increases in the formal sector but falls in the informal sector. This is a consequence of the fact that tightness and search in the formal sector increases whereas the opposite movements take place in the informal sector. The negative impact on the value of being a manual worker, rU m , dominates. Hence more workers will educate themselves as increased punishment of the informal sector makes it less attractive to remain a manual worker.
Equation (34) gives the impact on the number of educated workers as the tax rates increases, for a given punishment system. The first term captures the effect on the educated labour force of an increase in the tax rates working through ψ. Increased taxation induces the opposite movements as was described in connection to equation (33) and analogous reasoning can be conducted. The second term in (34) captures the impact of increased taxation for a given wedge, ψ. Increased taxation reduces the consumer wages for both educated and manual workers, but it will not affect the costs of higher education. Consequently, the value of being an educated worker falls by relative more than the value of being a manual worker; the number of educated workers falls. As the effects work in the same direction, we conclude that the number of educated workers in the economy tends to decrease with increased taxation.
In order to consider fully financed increases in the punishment rates, we need to consider the impact of the tax and punishment rates on the government revenues. The tax and punishment rates affect the government revenues in a number of ways (details are given in an appendix). Assuming that we are located on the positively sloped side of the Laffer curves, and hence dynamic adjustments in equilibrium wages, employment rates and labour forces are not dominating the direct effects, government revenue increases with increased tax rates and punishment rates. 18 An increase in the punishment rate accordingly calls for reductions in the tax rates in order to maintain a balanced budget. We can then rewrite the government budget restriction in (32) as φ t = h(φ p ), where
We have the following result.
Proposition 5 A fully financed increase in the punishment rate (δ or α) will increase the number of educated workers.
Unemployment
This section is concerned with how the number of unemployed workers is affected by changes in the tax and punishment systems. As is clear from section 2.4, the total number of unemployed workers, as well as the number of unemployed workers observable by the government, depends on the division of labour across sectors. Since the division of labour across sectors depends on the tax rates, φ t , separate from the wedge, ψ, we have to account for the government budget restriction explicitly. Again we assume that we are located on the positively sloped side of the Laffer curves. 19 Proposition 6 A fully financed increase in the punishment rate (δ or α) will reduce total unemployment, ∂U T OT ∂φ p < 0, if ψ < 1 and the rate of unemployed manual workers is higher than the rate of unemployment of higher educated workers, u m > u h .
In the empirically relevant case where unemployment for manual workers is higher than unemployment of educated workers, higher punishment rates reduce total unemployment. There is both a direct impact from a reduction in the unemployment rate for manual workers and an indirect impact through the shift of workers from the manual labour force towards the educated labour force.
Welfare
This section is concerned with welfare analysis and the optimal design of tax and punishment policies. As we showed in Section 3.4, a reduction in the attractiveness of the informal sector, makes it relatively less attractive to be a manual worker. This induces more workers to educate themselves. We concluded that increasing the wedge between the informal and the formal sector increases the number of educated workers by reducing the relative attractiveness to be a manual worker. Consequently, the size of the wedge is an important determinant of the size of the educated labour force. This is essential when considering welfare. If economic policy is conducted so as to fight the underground economy, increasing the punishment rates will at the same time increase the number of educated workers. In case the educated labour force is inefficiently low, this provides an additional argument for fighting the informal sector. If, on the other hand, the educated labour force is inefficiency high, combatting the informal sector induces a welfare cost in the sense that the educated labour force becomes even higher.
This suggests that the punishment rates are potential instruments that can be used to affect the number of educated workers and thereby welfare. There may, of course, be other more direct instruments if the pure aim is to correct for inefficiencies in the educational level in an economy, but nevertheless, it should be acknowledged that the wedge actually has an impact on the number of educated workers and thereby potentially has an impact on welfare in the economy. This becomes clear if we take a closer look at the welfare effects of the model.
We make use of a utilitarian welfare function, which is obtained by adding all individuals' and firms' steady state flow values of welfare. In order to disregard from congestion externalities we assume that β = η. The social welfare function is written as:
We assume that firms are owned by "rentiers" who do not work. By making use of the asset equations for workers and firms in the three sectors, imposing the flow equilibrium conditions as well as the government budget restriction in (32), and considering the case of no discounting, i.e., r → 0, we can write the welfare function as:
where 20 With the assumption of risk neutral individuals, we ignore distributional issues and hence wages will not feature in the welfare function.
Examining the welfare measure in (35) reveals that we have to consider both how the tax and punishment system affects the welfare of the manual and highly educated sector, W m and W h , and how it affects the stock of manual and highly educated workers, 1 −ê. We see from the welfare specification in (35), (36), and (37) that changes in the punishment rates, δ or α, only affects welfare through its effect on the wedge, ψ. The wedge, 20 This welfare measure is analogous to the welfare measure described in, for example, Pissarides (2000) as it gives the aggregate production minus total vacancy costs, i.e. we note that
The educational cost is of course added as a cost to the welfare measure.
in turn, affects total welfare, W , through its impact on welfare for manual workers, W m , and through its impact on the number workers acquiring education, 1 −ê. As is clear from (37), W h is independent of the tax and punishment rates. Changes in the tax rates, t and z, on the other hand, affects W through the wedge, ψ, but it will also have a direct effect on the number of workers acquiring education.
Let us first consider how a change in the number of workers acquiring education influence the social welfare measure. We can conclude the following:
Welfare raises when more workers acquire education whenever the number of educated workers are too low from a welfare point of view. Similarly, welfare falls as more workers acquire education when too many workers are educated from a welfare perspective. 21 By looking at the market solution for the stock of educated workers, it is clear that it is exclusively the tax and punishment system that distorts educational choice. The equation for educational choice (31) can be written as
by using the expressions for rU m and rU h from sections 2.1 and 2.2. We note that there are two sources through which the tax and punishment system distorts the educational choice, namely through the punishment tax wedge, ψ, and through the tax rates, φ t . The first distortion on educational choice appears when ψ departs from unity. When ψ < 1, being a manual worker is rather pleasant as attractive employment opportunities in an informal sector are available. This reduces the incentives of education, which tends to imply that too few workers educate themselves. For ψ > 1, on the other hand, employment opportunities in an informal sector are not very attractive as the expected punishment rates are higher than the tax rates. This increases the incentives of education, tending to make too many people educate themselves. The second distortion on educational choice follows as tax rates are positive, φ t > 1. Taxation hits educated workers more severely than manual workers, which reduces the incentives of education. Hence, positive tax
The intuition for the result in proposition 7 follows from that the educational stock is inefficiently low in case ψ ≤ 1. The first term in (39) captures how welfare is affected when more workers acquire education. Recall from Section 3.4 that the number of educated workers increases with increased punishment of the informal sector. Hence as welfare always increases with additional punishment as long as ψ ≤ 1, it is optimal to increase the punishment rates above unity to create incentives for education. However, the second term in (39) becomes negative when ψ exceeds unity. This term captures how the value of being a manual worker is affected by ψ. When ψ deviates from unity there is a distortion between the informal and the formal sector. Regarding the second term, if ψ < 1, too much work from a welfare point of view is carried out in the informal sector, and vice versa when ψ > 1. 23 Hence, when ψ < 1, welfare improves when increasing ψ both because it increases the stock of educated workers and because it reduces the distortion between the informal and formal sector. However, when ψ > 1, additional punishment of the informal sector brings about a negative effect on welfare as it increases the distortion between the formal and the informal sector. Eventually, further increases in the punishment rates will induce welfare to fall.
From proposition (7), we can conclude that:
Corollary 8 The number of educated workers are below what is socially optimal when the punishment rate is chosen optimally, i.e., when ψ = ψ * .
This follows from the first order condition determining the optimal punishment rate (39) and equation (38), where the socially optimal number of educated workers are determined by ∂W ∂(1−ê) = 0. From (39) we observe that the welfare maximizing punishment rate is set so that ∂W ∂(1−ê) > 0, fulfilling the first order condition as the second term is negative for ψ > 1, which implies that the educated stock is below what is socially optimal. This intuitively follows as it is not optimal to set the punishment so to fully correct for the inefficiently low stock of educated workers, as such a choice implies a distortion between the formal and the informal sector. As it is a trade-off between the two distortions, it is never optimal to fully eliminate one of the them.
The results that the punishment rates should be set such that the informal sector is punished to a larger extent than the formal sector is taxed, i.e., ψ > 1, should clearly not be taken literally. Merely it points at that it is potentially important for welfare to acknowledge that employment opportunities in an informal sector may reduce the incentive to acquire education.
Conclusion
This paper has examined the consequences of the fact that work opportunities in the informal sector mainly face workers at the lower end of the skill distribution. When considering the individual choice of higher education, we usually think that the wage premium of education and the relative employment probabilities are the important factors to weight against the cost of education. However, acknowledging that mainly manual sector workers face work opportunities in the informal sector, these workers may have much better employment perspectives than what is revealed by just considering formal sector wages and unemployment rates. Hence, informal sector employment opportunities may reduce the incentives to acquire higher education and thereby reduce the educated labour force. This paper developed a three-sector general equilibrium model featuring matching frictions and worker-firm wage bargains. Workers differed with respect to ability, and the choice of education was endogenously determined. Job opportunities in an informal sector were only available to manual workers. We asked if increased punishment of the informal sector and/or reduced taxation induced more workers to educate themselves. The answer to that question was yes, and the story just told provides the intuition behind this result.
The second aim of this paper was to study how labour market performance, and in particular unemployment, where affected by increased punishment of the informal sector and/or reduced taxation. Although some recent studies have shed light on how punishment policies affects unemployment, this papers uses a framework which enabled us to study the impact of tax and punishment policies when workers are searching in both a formal and an informal sector. We found that increased punishment, most likely would reduce the number of unemployed workers.
Finally, the paper characterized the optimal tax and punishment system. We showed that it was optimal to punish the informal sector to a larger extent than the formal sector is taxed. The optimal choice of tax and punishment system, however, implied an inefficiently low stock of educated workers. The results show that it potentially is important to take into account the impact of the employment opportunities in the informal sector on education, as it in turn, may have consequences for welfare.
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Equilibrium
We will draw the equilibrium for the manual sector in a diagram with search intensity, σ, on the first axis and relative tightness on the second axis, θ F θ I . We draw two curves, one representing the two first equilibrium equations, (27) and (28), denoted Consider the case when η = 1 2 . In this case we can solve explicitly for labour market tightness in the two sectors, and then deriving Given that an equilibrium exists it will therefore be unique and stable. See the next section for intuition for stability. We illustrate this in Figure 1 for ψ < 1.
The steeper curve represents σ 
The impact of an increase in the wedge
When the wedge increases, the search intensity curve, σ Figure 2 . When the punishment rates increase relative to the tax rates, ψ increases, search intensity falls for given relative labour market tightness, θ F θ I . We move from the initial equilibrium horizontally to the left till the new search intensity curve is reached. A lower search intensity increases relative tightness as it induces a reduction in formal producer wages and an increase in informal producer wages. In the diagram, this corresponds to a vertical movement until we reach the relative labour market tightness curve. This, in turn, causes another reduction in search intensity, however the impact is now smaller than before. And again, the decrease in σ implies that relative tightness increases. The impacts become smaller and smaller until the new equilibrium is reached.
Proofs of propositions and lemmas
Proof of proposition 1:
Proof. Differentiating equations (27), (28) and (29) with respect to ψ gives: (30) it is apparent that tightness in sector h is not affected by changes in the tax or punishment rates. A closer look at (32) reveals that the government can choose φ t and φ p = ψφ t for a given ψ so to increase or reduce revenues in order to balance its budget as long as R is a feasible revenue requirement. We do not need not have to assume that we are located on the positively sloped side of the Laffer curves.
Proof of proposition 2:
Proof. Differentiate (13) and (14) with respect to ψ, considering that θ 
